Quick Study: Voting Machines

Do voting machines work as well as they should?

Here we are at the dawn of the 21st century, the height of the Information Age, mere months before a major election, and Americans still aren't sure that their votes will be recorded the way they cast them.

Much of the uncertainty involves the rapid conversion in the last decade from paper ballots to computer voting, or "e-voting," which promised to be faster, cheaper, and less subject to human error. But after a flurry of election scandals and machine breakdowns, more than half of the states now require voting systems that leave a paper trail in case a recount is needed. Apoplectic champions of e-voting argue that human error and poll-worker shortages pose bigger threats than technical glitches and crazed hackers. In the end, it all comes down to voter confidence. (According to blackboxvoting.org, an avowed enemy of e-voting, voters in Maine, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin can be most confident. Those in Pennsylvania and Texas, on the other hand, have the most to worry about.)

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) gave $3.9 billion to states in 2002 to help replace punch card and lever systems with optical-scanning or electronic (usually touch screen) systems. Cuyahoga County, Ohio, a flash point in the voting-machine controversy, spent $21 million to switch to touch screens in 2006. This year, it could spend up to $12 million to switch again, this time to optical scanners. Much of the country finds itself in the same predicament:

Do we have the right machines? Can we get the right machines in time for the next election? And do we even know for sure which machines are the most reliable?

When it comes to voting, America is still a nation divided. Thirty-three percent of us will vote on touch screens in November. Sixty percent will use paper ballots tabulated by optical scanners. But since the Holt bill-which would have reimbursed states for switching to paper-ballot voting systems-was recently defeated in Congress, Americans may find themselves doubting the democratic process once again. Protect your vote by confirming your voter registration; many states will be using centralized records for the first time. Better yet, volunteer as a poll worker. One of the few things e-voting fans and opponents agree on is that the best insurance for a fair election is an equal number of Democratic and Republican eyes watching the ballot box.

Flash Points

• Stuffed ballot boxes in one Texas precinct allegedly give Lyndon B. Johnson a razor-thin victory over challenger Coke Stevenson in the 1948 Senate primary race.

• Eight ballot box lids from the 2001 election are discovered floating in San Francisco Bay. An election official says the dirty lids were scrubbed and left to dry on Fisherman's Wharf.

• Optical scanners pass preelection tests in Napa County, California, but then fail to count more than 6,000 votes.

• Ohio is central to many of these controversies. In August 2003 the CEO of Diebold, based in North Canton, gushes in a Republican fund-raising letter that he is "committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the President." Critics are unmoved when Diebold points out that its election-machines operation is based in Texas and the CEO has no day-to-day control. The gaffe galvanizes the anti-DRE movement, especially after Bush's 2.1 percent victory over Kerry in the state.

• Shortages of electronic machines in the state that cemented President Bush's electoral-college win force Columbus, Ohio, voters to stand in line for more than ten hours in some precincts. Thousands give up and go home without voting. Longtime voters can't vote, because their registrations have been purged. In Youngstown, 25 machines transfer an unknown number of votes from the Kerry to the Bush column. Problems are worse in Democratic-leaning precincts. Later, Cuyahoga County scraps most DREs and replaces them with paper ballots and optical scanners. Long lines continue to be a problem in primary voting this year.

• Only 369 votes separate Democrat Christine Jennings from winner Vern Buchanan, a Republican, in a November 2006 Congressional race. But a recount shows 18,000 undervotes-ballots with every race marked except this one. DRE opponents argue that the touch screen machines malfunctioned, partly due to the Florida humidity. Jennings's election challenge is dismissed.

Forward Thinking
• Better machines-DREs with paper trails, and optical scanners that will spit back messed-up ballots to voters for a do-over-may restore voter confidence.

• Solid vote verification may also help: Princeton Professor Edward Felten is researching a Las Vegas-style vote-checking system in which dice or lottery balls are used to randomly select precincts to conduct hand recounts once the polls are closed.

• Rep. Rush Holt (D., New Jersey) introduced a bill last year that would reimburse states and localities that switch to paper-ballot systems. It's still making its way through Congress. (A similar bill of Holt's was blocked by Republicans in April.)

• Make Voting Work and electionline.org, two projects funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, are researching the feasibility of training poll workers online.

• Younger, more computer-literate poll workers who aren't fazed by printer jams and computer crashes are being recruited.

• Electronic poll books, instead of reams of computer paper, help speed up lines.

The Time Line

1790s-1830s: Voice vote
Pros -- Voters are sworn in and announce their choice to the clerk, who records it in a poll book next to their names. No ballot box, so it can't be stuffed.
Cons -- No privacy.

1830s-1880s: Paper ballot
Pros -- "Transparent"-easy to understand and recount, and can be made private. The ultimate paper trail.
Cons -- Lost ballots, ballot box stuffing.

1890s: Mechanical lever machine
Pros -- Prevents "overvotes" (voting for more than one candidate for the same race). Machine-counted results available immediately, eliminating the need for hand-counting.
Cons -- No paper trail. Votes "disappear" the minute the lever is pulled.

1960s: Punch Cards
Pros -- Easily stored ballots provide paper trail for recounts.
Cons -- Overvotes, undervotes (skipping races), voter error. "Hanging chads." Bad design (the "butterfly ballot" in the 2000 Presidential race).

1980s: Optical scanners
Pros -- Voters mark ballot, which is then read by optical scanner. Creates paper trail plus electronic record. Vote is immediately visible to voter, and hand recounts can be done with actual ballots. Faster for voters than touch screens.
Cons -- Paper ballots difficult to transport, store. Print quality and design vary, making some ballots hard to decipher.

2000s:
DREs, no paper trail
Pros -- Impossible to overvote, hard to undervote. Shorter lines, faster count. Multiple electronic records of each vote.

Cons -- Machines crash, lose or "flip" votes. No paper trail creates possibility of fraud. Tampering almost impossible to detect. Precincts dependent on manufacturers to maintain machines. And voters don't seem to trust them.

DREs, paper trail
Pros -- Voters can check final vote before casting. Machine prints tape of all votes.
Cons -- Same as at left, plus printer jams. Hacker can plant virus in machine before it's used, rigging results. Or original software can have bugs. Paper trail is a mile long.

Voting over the Internet (VOI)
Pros -- Web-based registration and voting-still being developed-is a boon for absentee voters, who otherwise mail in their ballots. Paper copies of digital votes would provide paper trail.
Cons -- Will voters ever trust ballots cast in cyberspace?

The Back-and-Forth

"All you need to rig an electronic voting machine is a memory card and a filing cabinet key or a screwdriver. I know, because I've done it in my lab."
--Edward W. Felten, professor of computer science, Princeton University, and maker of "Diebold Hacked!" video

"A decent-size ballot box holds 10,000 paper ballots, and they don't have to be hacked to be stolen. Paper itself is probably the most insecure voting medium there is."
--Paul Herrnson, director, Center for American Politics and Citizenship, University of Maryland

"The elephant in the room is public perception. There's something inherently reassuring about marking a paper ballot."
--Chris Riggall, spokesman, Diebold, Inc.

"There is no 'best' voting technology. What we have is a 'least bad' technology, and right now that's paper ballots read by optical scanners."
--Avi Rubin, author of Brave New Ballot: The Battle to Safeguard Democracy in the Age of Electronic Voting