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Plans for Victory
McCain: For most of the occupation, our military strategy was built around trying to secure the entirety of Iraq at the same time. But the coalition never had enough troops to do this, and it led to a dead end: our forces mounting "search and destroy" operations to root out insurgent strongholds, with the aim of killing as many insurgents as possible. Since our troops could not hold the ground indefinitely, they have had to move on to fight other battles. When they do so, the insurgent ranks replenish and the strongholds fill again. Our troops then have to re-enter the same area and re-fight the same battle. This has meant seasonal offensives in places like Tal Afar, where our troops fought in September 2003, 2004 and 2005.A better approach is the so-called "oil spot" strategy that draws upon successful counterinsurgency efforts in the past. Rather than focusing on killing and capturing insurgents, we should emphasize protecting the local population by creating secure areas where insurgents find it difficult to operate. Our forces begin by clearing areas, with heavy force if necessary, to establish a zone as free of insurgents as possible. The security forces then cordon off the zone, establish constant patrols, by American and Iraqi military and police, to protect the population from insurgents and common crime, and arrest remaining insurgents as they are found.
In this newly secure environment, many of the things critical to winning in Iraq can take place -- things that are not happening today. Massive reconstruction can go forward without fear of attack and sabotage. Political meetings and campaigning can take place in the open. And civil society can emerge. As these elements reinforce each other, the security forces then expand the territory under their control. This kind of counterinsurgency strategy must be coupled with other elements of a broader Iraq strategy: keeping senior military officers in place, rather than rotating them out of Iraq; building ethnically diverse military units; keeping the pressure on Syria and Iran to secure their borders; and speaking forthrightly about the stakes to the American people, as the President is doing. There is some indication that the Pentagon is moving to embrace an "oil spot" strategy, and that is to the good. But it will be difficult to do if calls for troop withdrawals are successful.
Biden: There are three main parts to my plan.
First -- we need to build political consensus, starting with a constitution all Iraqis can buy into. Sunnis must accept that they no longer rule Iraq. But unless Shi'ites and Kurds give them a stake in the new deal, they will continue to resist.
The United States shouldn't be the only nation striving for this: We need a regional strategy that persuades Iraq's neighbors to wield their influence with the Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds. No one but the terrorists wants Iraq descending into civil war.
From Europe to Asia, all the major international powers also have a stake in the outcome in Iraq. They need to get over their bruised feelings at how we went into Iraq, and we need to get over our reluctance to fully involve them.
I'd like to see a "Contact Group" for Iraq led by these countries and institutions like NATO and the European Union that becomes Baghdad's main political partner. That would take some of the burden off us and maximize the pressure on Iraq's main groups to compromise.
Second -- we must build Iraq's governing capacity and overhaul the reconstruction effort. Iraq's ministries are barely functional. We need a civilian commitment in Iraq equal to our military effort. Just as military personnel are required to go to Iraq, the President should identify more skilled foreign service officers to help get the government up to speed.
And countries that have pledged aid must deliver it. As of the beginning of 2006, only $3 billion of the $13.5 billion in non-American assistance made it to Iraq. Meanwhile, our Arab allies in the Persian Gulf have reaped huge windfall oil profits. It is time they give back.
Third -- we have to transfer authority to effective Iraqi security forces. In September 2005, Gen. George Casey acknowledged that only one Iraqi battalion -- less than 1,000 troops -- is capable of fighting without U.S. help. Another 40 or so could lead counterinsurgency operations with our support. The President must set a schedule for getting Iraqi forces trained to the point they can act on their own or take the lead.
We should take other countries up on their offers to do more training, especially of officers. We should focus on putting the sectarian militia out of business and building the security ministries. Even the best- trained troops will not succeed if the civilian government can't pay them, equip them, supply them and direct them.
And, ultimately, we must hope that Iraqis are developing a national identity and a vision for their country that will inspire their politics so they can set aside their sectarian, tribal and ethnic divisions.
RD: When will our troops come home?
Biden: I'm convinced that in 2006, American troops will begin to leave Iraq in large numbers -- as many as 60,000. In 2007, a significant number of the remaining 100,000 American soldiers will follow. A small residual force, probably between 20,000 and 40,000, will stay behind -- in Iraq or across the border -- to strike at any concentration of terrorists, to keep Iraq's neighbors honest, and to continue training and equipping the Iraqi security forces.
We will not and should not pull out all our troops at once. Nor should we draw down based on an artificial deadline or timetable. But we simply cannot sustain 150,000 Americans in Iraq without extending deployment times, sending soldiers back for a fifth or sixth tour, pulling troops from other regions, or mobilizing the entire National Guard. That would severely damage our all-volunteer military. Even if we could keep a larger force in Iraq, it no longer makes sense to do so. Our idea of liberation is increasingly felt as occupation. And we risk creating a culture of dependency, especially among Iraqi security forces.
The Bush Administration has made many mistakes and squandered endless opportunities in Iraq. But we still have a chance to succeed. If redeployment is accompanied by measurable progress in forging a political settlement, building real Iraqi governing capacity, and transferring control to effective Iraqi security forces, we can start the journey home from Iraq with our vital interests intact.
McCain: To enhance our chances of success, and to enable our forces to hold as much territory as possible, we must maximize the total number of coalition and Iraqi troops. That's why I believe the current ideas to draw down our forces this year are exactly wrong. While the United States and its partners are training Iraqi security forces at a furious pace, these Iraqis should supplement, not substitute for, the coalition forces on the ground. Our decisions about troop levels should be tied to the success or failure of our mission in Iraq, not to the number of Iraqi troops trained and equipped, nor to arbitrary deadlines rooted in our domestic politics.
This may well mean we are in Iraq for years to come, and we should have no illusions about the difficulty of our road ahead. Implementing the steps I have outlined will take more time, more commitment, and more support, and more brave Americans will lose their lives in the service of this great cause. And despite all of America's cajoling and pleading, few other countries around the world will share much of our burden. Iraq is for us to do, for us to win or lose, for us to suffer the consequences or share in the benefits. There's only one United States of America, and it is to us that history will look for courage and commitment.
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