Del.icio.us
Digg
Reddit
Facebook
StumbleUpon
TwitThis
DETECTING THE DANGER
Another concern is the government's effort to set up a system to detect and respond to bioterror attacks. A key component of that initiative is BioWatch, in which technicians have deployed a system of sensors in more than 30 undisclosed cities to detect some airborne biological threats, including anthrax, plague, and smallpox.
In theory, BioWatch would set off early-warning systems in the Department of Homeland Security, which also oversees the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, charged with integrating and analyzing data from 12 different agencies to ensure the earliest possible detection of a biological attack. It's a comforting idea. There's only one problem: It takes as long as 34 hours for threats to register with BioWatch, according to the GAO, because the air samples are manually collected and taken for analysis in labs. By the time results are analyzed, individuals exposed to the contaminants would likely have scattered, limiting the ability of first responders to contain the outbreak.
Efforts are under way to develop new technologies. But most experts agree the system is a long way from providing real-time detection or even registering the full arsenal of biological threats facing the United States. As Dr. Hamburg says, 9/11 led to a "lot of wishful thinking that new technologies might be the answer. There were a lot of investments made—some that made sense, some that didn't."
LOOKING FOR LEADERSHIP
How best to address the wasteful funding and bad planning in our biodefense programs? Milton Leitenberg, a University of Maryland researcher who authored a 2005 report on biodefense published by the Army War College, argues that a careful review and assessment of the various terrorist threats the country faces is essential, to be quickly followed by the designation of a person, or at the very least one agency, empowered to make changes. When biodefense programs were implemented after 9/11, he says, "there was really no significant public figure saying 'Just a minute—let's do an assessment first.' "
Dr. Hamburg hopes that the government's misconceptions about and mistakes in its biosecurity efforts will be faced squarely by the next Congress and especially by the incoming president and his national-security team. The new administration is going to have to "make some hard decisions about what programs just haven't fulfilled their promise or never made sense in the beginning, and which programs have value but need to be strengthened or extended," she says.
Whatever happens, Leroy Richmond will be watching. Seven years after the attack, tossing a football around with his 13-year-old son or vacuuming around the house is enough to exhaust him. Unable to return to work because of his health, he sometimes loses his train of thought midconversation—"senior moments," he insists, that are unrelated to his age. But he trusts the government he worked for all those decades to get it right. He believes it's only a matter of time.
--ProPublica's Marcus Stern received a Pulitzer Prize in 2006 for his role in breaking the story of former Rep. Randy "Duke" Cunningham's political corruption. Adam Piore is a former editor at Newsweek. For more on this story, including links and resources, go to propublica.org.
COMING TO A TOWN NEAR YOU? -- By Carol Kaufmann
Biosafety Level-4 labs, which handle the most deadly pathogens, like Ebola, have tripled since 9/11. The number of Level-3 labs handling dangerous germs like anthrax has swelled to more than 1,350-too many to map below.
THE WAR AT HOME
Six years after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, we asked Secretary Michael Chertoff about the bioterror threat.
Q: The federal government has spent more than $48 billion to combat bioterrorism, resulting in more labs and scientists handling these pathogens. Are we more vulnerable?
A: No. I think the stuff we have experimented with is very tightly secured, both against release as well as any possible attack. The problem is that the ingredients for a biological weapon can be found in nature.
Q: Where in the U.S. are we vulnerable now?
A: Traditionally, the threats have been focused on big cities. As we increase our security in the cities, the possibility remains [that terrorists] will shift their focus to other locations. In this country and other countries, some plotting has occurred and been carried out in middle-size communities.
Q: The FBI was investigating an insider for the 2001 anthrax attack. Is the country protected from its own employees?
A: Since that case, we've taken a hard look at security procedures. We have good security measures at high-threat labs. We do thorough background checks. With the BioWatch program, we have the capability to detect biological agents in the air and to collect clinical data that would indicate something is going on.
Q: How can BioWatch be fine-tuned?
A: The next generation that we're working on will give us more of a real-time composition of air with only a number of hours' delay, greatly reducing the wait time.
Q: Is Al Qaeda less of a threat than pre-9/11?
A: Yes, because of where we now are in Afghanistan. [Al Qaeda doesn't] have a full country in which they can operate with impunity, building laboratories in which to experiment with chemical and biological weapons, training openly, having the support of the leadership in that country.
Q: Thomas Kean, chairman of the 9/11 commission, has said "the weakest part of our homeland security is the citizen." What's your advice about disaster preparation?
A: People are very good about reporting stuff that they see is suspicious. The area where I think Kean is right is in the response to a disaster. A lot of people shy away from making minimal preparations. We have a site, ready.gov, that will tell you the basic things [you need] to be prepared for any kind of emergency.`1
Q: Do you sleep well at night?
A: I do. Terrorism shouldn't be an abiding preoccupation. If [everyone were] talking about homeland security 90 percent of the time, we wouldn't have done our job right. Still, we shouldn't become complacent.
INSIDE BIODEFENSE
Number of U.S. scientists authorized to work with deadly pathogens: 15,000
Federal agencies that fund, operate, or work with Biosafety Level-3 or Level-4 labs: 12
Federal agencies charged with tracking the number and assessing the risks of all Level-3 and Level-4 labs: 0
8 Warming Soup Recipes
Video: Expired Foods in Your Supermarket
4 Ways to Strengthen Your Immune System
Joke: The burial service for the elderly woman climaxed with…
Advertisement 
